Turning the Tables on RDS: Racially Revealing Questions Asked by White Judges by Backhouse, Constance
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 44 
Issue 1 44:1 (2021) Special Issue: Purdy 
Crawford Workshop: The Role of Business 




Turning the Tables on RDS: Racially Revealing Questions Asked by 
White Judges 
Constance Backhouse 
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Race Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
Recommended Citation 
Constance Backhouse, "Turning the Tables on RDS: Racially Revealing Questions Asked by White Judges" 
(2021) 44:1 Dal LJ 181. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Turning the Tables on RDS: Racially Revealing Questions Asked by White Judges 
Cover Page Footnote 
This article is part of a larger project: a full book on the RDS case. 
This article is available in Dalhousie Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj/vol44/iss1/9 
Constance Backhouse*  Turning the Tables on RDS: Racially
 Revealing Questions Asked by White
 Judges
In the 1997 RDS case, the Supreme Court of Canada deliberated on the concept of 
judicial race bias. The decision subjected the oral ruling of a lower court trial judge 
in a busy Youth Court to close scrutiny. The majority of the nine-person, all-white 
bench reprimanded Canada’s first Black female judge, whose words about police 
officers who “overreact” in dealing with racialized youth they found “troubling” 
and “worrisome.” This article places the same close scrutiny on the words of the 
white judges who were most critical of the trial judge. It examines their informal 
interjections and comments at the Supreme Court oral hearing. Making use of the 
appellate transcript and video-recording of the oral argument, it concludes that the 
informal comments of the top court judges exemplified many of the patterns that 
anti-racist educators describe as indicative of a lack of understanding of racism.
Dans l’affaire RDS de 1997, la Cour suprême du Canada a délibéré sur le concept 
de partialité raciale judiciaire.  La décision a soumis à un examen minutieux la 
décision prononcée oralement par une juge de première instance dans un tribunal 
pour adolescents très fréquenté.  La majorité des neuf juges, tous de race blanche, 
ont réprimandé la première juge de race noire au Canada, dont les propos sur les 
agents de police qui « réagissent de façon excessive » lorsqu’ils traitent avec des 
jeunes racialisés ont été jugés « inquiétants ». Le présent article examine avec 
la même attention les propos des juges blancs qui ont le plus critiqué la juge de 
première instance. Il examine leurs interjections et commentaires informels lors 
de l’audience de la Cour suprême. S’appuyant sur la transcription de l’appel et 
l’enregistrement vidéo de la plaidoirie, il conclut que les commentaires informels des 
juges de la Cour suprême illustrent bon nombre des modèles que les éducateurs 
antiracistes décrivent comme révélateurs d’un manque de compréhension du 
racisme. 
* Professor of Law, University of Ottawa. This article is part of a larger project: a full book on the 
RDS case.  I am indebted to Sylvia Rich and Stefanie Carsley for suggesting this article, and to Sylvia, 
Holland Stille, Mirsa Duka, Diana Majury, and Diana Backhouse for helping me think it through.
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III. The professional culture of whiteness




RDS v The Queen is the most significant case on judicial race bias in 
Canadian history.1 In 1994, Canada’s first Black female judge, Corrine 
Sparks, acquitted a Black male teenager in the Youth Justice Court in 
Halifax, while remarking on the overreaction of police in their dealings 
with non-white youth. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada probed 
the words of her oral judgment so closely that even the Crown lawyer 
suggested that “we may be analyzing it in more depth” than “some of 
the words might deserve.”2 Ultimately, six of the nine justices on the all-
white Supreme Court upheld Judge Sparks’ decision to acquit.3 But two 
of the judges in the majority, Justices Cory and Iacobucci, found that her 
“unfortunate” and “troubling” comments “were worrisome and came 
very close to the line.”4 Three others—Chief Justice Lamer and Justices 
Sopinka and Major—dissented, concluding that her words went over 
the line, raising a reasonable apprehension of bias sufficient to warrant 
quashing Judge Sparks’ decision.5 Significantly, that meant the majority 
1. R v RDS, [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193 [RDS].
2. Supreme Court of Canada Appeal Transcript, RDS v Her Majesty the Queen Supreme Court 
of Canada, Library and Archives Canada RG 125, vol 5231, file 25063A [Appeal Transcript], Oral 
Argument, Robert E. Lutes, at 66.
3. Justices McLachlin, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, La Forest, Cory, and Iacobucci.
4. RDS, supra note 1 at 543-545.
5. Ibid at 500.
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of the judges on the top court found that her reflections on white racism 
were improper. 
What if the tables were turned? What if the white Supreme Court 
judges’ questions and interjections in the courtroom hearing for the 
RDS appeal were given the same scrutiny for racial bias? Chief Justice 
Antonio Lamer’s comments became notorious after his remarks provoked 
a Canadian Judicial Council complaint.6 But a fuller examination of the 
words he and Justices Major and Sopinka uttered in the open courtroom 
offers a window into the minds of some of those tasked with ruling on 
racial bias. When judges freely articulate their thoughts in an in-person 
oral hearing, it can do more than foreshadow the ultimate decision. The 
off-the-cuff discussion can be quite different from formalized decisions 
written months later. The type of scrutiny one gives to a trial judge’s oral 
decision may find a better analogue in appellate judges’ questions and 
remarks in the hearing, rather than their heavily edited judgments. When 
the focus pivots away from Judge Sparks, to scrutinize the Supreme Court 
judges’ spoken words, it is very revealing.
I should clarify that I self-identify as a white Canadian. While I hope 
to challenge the thinking that comes from white privilege, I do not want 
to suggest that I am free from the pervasive racism that generations of 
white Canadians have displayed. I acknowledge that it is easier to spot 
it in others, and I do not wish to suggest that the Supreme Court justices 
were not exemplary judges or persons in other respects. I am unsure 
whether I would have done substantially better in 1997, had I been a judge 
questioning the RDS counsel. The author of So You Want to Talk About 
Race, Ijeoma Oluo, emphasizes that upending centuries-old systems of 
racism “is not an easy fix.” 7 The author of White Fragility, Robin DiAngelo, 
writes that “racism is deeply complex and nuanced, and given this, we can 
never consider our learning to be complete or finished.” 8 Ibram X Kendi 
compares it to “fighting an addiction,” noting that “being an antiracist 
requires persistent self-awareness, constant self-criticism, and regular 
self-examination.”9 I think we should take up the challenge to engage in 
an ongoing exercise to come to grips with our own racism. Anti-racist 
activists have urged white people to examine how our white institutions 
and whiteness bolster racism. Oluo, DiAngelo, Kendi, and Reni Eddo-
Lodge have offered important theoretical and structural frameworks for 
6. Letter from the Chinese Canadian National Council to the Canadian Judicial Council (28 
October 1997). For fuller discussion, see below.
7. Ijeoma Oluo, So You Want to Talk About Race (New York: Seal Press, 2019) at 7.
8. Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility (Boston: Beacon Press, 2018) at xv. 
9. Ibram X Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist (New York: One World, 2019) at 23.
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the inquiry.10 Their insights allow us to examine the RDS case from a new 
perspective and help emphasize why our judges (and all of us non-judges) 
must expand our understanding of the fullness of racism.
“Race” is a fiction, a socially-constructed myth that purports to divide 
human beings into distinct categories. The fictional classifications and 
terminologies have changed over time and place. “How the Irish Became 
White” is one of the most revealing of book titles, but others historically 
differentiated from the “white” category include English working-class 
communities, Jews, Muslims, French-Canadians, Indo-Canadians, 
Central Europeans, Eastern Europeans, Asians, and Indigenous peoples. 
Significantly, people already seen as “white” decided who was “white.”11 
This is why many anti-racist theorists describe “race” in scare 
quotes. It is why we refer to “racialized” people, to signify that “race” 
is a fiction, but racism is a pernicious reality.  In this article, which deals 
with specific geographic settings and times, I have chosen to step beyond 
the complexities of race definitions. Following the self-identification of 
the individuals involved and for ease of reference, I shall make use of 
simplified descriptors for the actors as “white” or “Black.” 12
The article begins with a description of the RDS case and the trial 
decision of Judge Corrine Sparks. It then turns to the oral hearing of the 
appeal before the nine white judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
It considers the hypothetical questions Chief Justice Lamer put to the 
lawyers, and the ensuing complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council (later 
dismissed) that accused him of embracing racial stereotypes. The article 
analyzes the context within which the judges operated: a professional 
legal culture of whiteness and a tradition of deference that impedes calling 
white judges on their racism. Lastly, it examines the words and phrases 
of the three dissenting judges—Chief Justice Lamer and Justices Major 
and Sopinka—whose ruling was the most scathing about Judge Sparks’ 
comments concerning police officers. This inquiry may help discern some 
of the patterns that white judges exhibit in discussions about racism. 
10. Oluo, supra note 7; DiAngelo, supra note 8; Kendi, supra note 9; Reni Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No 
Longer Talking to White People About Race (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017).
11. Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995); Nell Irvin Painter, 
The History of White People (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010); Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: 
A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900–1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
12. The New York Times explains that it capitalizes Black when it describes people and cultures of 
African origin, because it signifies a race and a culture rather than a colour. Nancy Coleman, “Why 
We’re Capitalizing Black”, New York Times (5 July 2020), online <www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/
insider/capitalized-black.html> [perma.cc/E5YY-46NQ].
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I. The RDS Case: A Brief Summary
The trial began in the Youth Justice Court in Halifax, Nova Scotia 
(“Youth Court”) on 2 December 1994.13 The courtroom configuration was 
apparently unprecedented in Canada: a Black accused (Rodney Darren 
Small), a Black defence lawyer (Burnley “Rocky” Jones), a Black court 
reporter (Marva Welch), a Black deputy sheriff (Ray Lawrence), and a 
Black judge (Corrine E Sparks). The only two white people in the room 
were the arresting officer (Constable Donald Stienburg) and the Crown 
prosecutor (Richard B Miller).14 
There were just two witnesses: Rodney Small and Constable Stienburg. 
Rodney Small testified that on 17 October 1993, he rode his bike past 
the scene of an arrest in a predominantly Black Halifax neighbourhood. 
Fifteen-year-old Rodney knew the Black boy in handcuffs; he was a cousin. 
Rodney testified that he rode up close to the white police officer who was 
arresting his cousin, and came to a halt straddling his bike. Rodney called 
out to his cousin, “What’s wrong? What happened?” Although Constable 
Donald Stienburg testified that Rodney drove the bike into his legs, 
Rodney denied that his bike was touching the officer. Rodney testified that 
the officer warned him to “shut up,” or he would be arrested next. Instead, 
Rodney said he had shouted to his cousin, “Do you want me to go tell your 
mother?” The officer testified that in an altercation that lasted for “a couple 
of seconds,” Rodney yelled at him and pushed him with his shoulders and 
hands. Rodney insisted that his hands were still on the handlebars and 
denied hitting the officer.15 
Both agreed that the bike was not travelling at great speed, and that 
the officer was not knocked over. Both agreed that Rodney never got off 
his bike. Both agreed that Officer Stienburg grabbed Rodney while he was 
still straddling his bike, and placed Rodney and his cousin simultaneously 
in chokeholds.16 Rodney was arrested and charged with assaulting a police 
officer, assaulting a police officer with intent to prevent the lawful arrest 
of another person, and obstruction of a police officer.17
13. RDS v Her Majesty the Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, Library and Archives Canada RG 125, 
vol 5231, file 25063A [Trial Transcript].
14. James W St G Walker, “A Black Day in Court: ‘Race’ and Judging in R v RDS” in Barrington 
Walker, ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey: Historical Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2012). Due to his age, the Young	Offenders	Act	prohibited the publication of Rodney Small’s 
name; the case is styled “R.D.S.” Subsequently, he gave his permission to disclose his full name. 
Interview with Rodney D Small (14 August 2018) in Halifax.
15. Trial Transcript, supra note 13.
16. Ibid.
17. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 270(1)(a)(b), 129(a).
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The disparities in age and physical stature between Constable 
Stienburg and Rodney Small were striking. The twenty-nine-year-old 
officer, a veteran of the SWAT team, stood more than six feet tall with a 
heavy-set athletic physique.18 Younger-looking than his age, Rodney was 
five-foot-eight and “105 pounds soaking wringing wet.” 19 The lawyer 
who defended Rodney called the charges “bogus,” overkill from a police 
force intent on teaching a young Black teenager not to interfere with an 
officer of the law.20 
 Unlike higher courts, where judges often reserve their judgments 
to give themselves time to consider their reasons, judges in the hectic Youth 
Court deliver oral rulings immediately after trial. In her oral judgment, 
Judge Sparks emphasized that the burden of proof was “squarely placed 
upon the Crown [to] prove all the elements of the offence beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Because Rodney’s handcuffed cousin no longer posed 
any “threat to the officer,” she wondered why Constable Stienburg would 
be “threatened by another young person who was merely trying to assist 
his friend in a non-threatening manner?” Although she stressed that she 
did not accept “everything” Rodney had said in court, she noted that he 
“seemed to be a rather honest young boy” who said “quite openly on 
cross-examination he was being nosey.” She observed that the officer 
“gave the Court the distinct impression that he had a rather difficult job 
in trying to restrain” the cousin, but had failed to mention that the boy 
was in handcuffs when Rodney arrived. “[W]hat was the big ordeal?” she 
added, “It’s a teenager, young person.” Counsel had not cited any of the 
multiple reports documenting disparate treatment of racialized individuals 
within the criminal justice system, and Judge Sparks made no mention of 
these, but she concluded that Rodney’s testimony had “raised a doubt in 
my mind” about what transpired. She dismissed all three charges. 21 Her 
next words had explosive consequences: 
I’m not saying that the Constable has misled the court, although police 
officers have been known to do that in the past. I am not saying that the 
officer overreacted, but certainly police officers do overreact, particularly 
when they are dealing with non-white groups. That to me, indicates a 
18. Interview with Donald Stienburg (28 September 2018) in Halifax.
19. Interview with Rodney Small, supra note 14; Walker, supra note 14 at 439.
20. Interview with Rodney Small, supra note 14.
21. Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 80-93. In Supplementary Reasons she issued after the 
conclusion of the trial, Judge Sparks made her first reference to the Royal Commission on the Donald 
Marshall, Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1989). The appellate courts ruled her 
Supplementary Reasons invalid because they were not issued during the trial, but after the court 
was no longer seized with the case. For further discussion of the Marshall Inquiry and other studies 
disclosing race disparities in the criminal justice system, see below.
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state of mind right there that is questionable. I believe that probably the 
situation in this particular case is the case of a young police officer who 
overreacted. I do accept the evidence of R.D.S. that he was told to shut 
up or he would be under arrest. That seems to be in keeping with the 
prevalent attitude of the day. 22
Although the word “racist” had never been said, the white officer 
believed that Judge Sparks had called him a racist.23 His complaint, 
supported by the white police chief and the white Crown prosecutor, set 
in motion a chain of appeals that led to the Supreme Court of Canada.24  
The Supreme Court hearing on 10 March 1997 involved an 
unprecedented number of Black lawyers. 25 Just two of the lawyers were 
white. Robert E Lutes QC represented the Crown and Dalhousie law 
professor Dianne Pothier appeared on behalf of Rodney Small. Rodney’s 
other lawyer was Burnley “Rocky” Jones, one of Canada’s foremost 
Black anti-racist activists.26 Yola Grant and Carol Allen, Black lawyers 
from Toronto, represented two intervener women’s groups.27 Black lawyer 
April Burey represented three Black intervener groups.28 The courtroom 
was jam-packed with Black observers who had arrived to bear witness to 
the historic case. Due to space limitations, most of the non-Blacks had 
moved to an overflow room, offering their seats to the Black observers. 29 
The courtroom had become another version of the earlier Halifax Youth 
Court hearing. The difference this time was the all-white bench of judges.
What must the Supreme Court judges have thought that morning, as 
they looked out on so many Black lawyers and observers? Their days were 
typically spent listening to an all-white cast of lawyers, members of their 
own racial group, in a racial context deemed normal or neutral in legal 
circles. Had they seen such a large Black assemblage in their courtroom 
before? Did they recognize that they were experiencing a rare moment 
in which the whiteness of their professional world had been displaced in 
22. Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 80-93.
23. Interview with Donald Stienburg, supra note 18.
24. Interview with Rick Miller (17 August 2018) in Halifax; Eva Hoare, “Halifax Police Chief to 
complain about remarks from judge,” Halifax Chronicle-Herald (13 December 1994). 
25. Six Black lawyers and articling students were seated at the counsel tables: Burnley “Rocky” 
Jones, Yola Grant, Carol Allen, April Burey, Jewel Amoah, and Douglas Johnson. The first five argued 
in support of Judge Sparks’ decision; the sixth was an articling student with the Crown Attorney.
26. Burnley “Rocky” Jones & James W St G Walker, Burnley “Rocky” Jones: Revolutionary (Black 
Point, Nova Scotia: Roseway/Fernwood, 2016).
27. The Women’s Legal and Education Action Fund, and the National Organization of Immigrant 
and Visible Minority Women of Canada; Interview with Yola Grant (22 March 2018) in Toronto; 
Interview with Carol Allen (31 May 2018) in Meaford, Ontario.
28. The African Canadian Legal Clinic and the Afro-Canadian Caucus of Nova Scotia. 
29. Interview with Lynn Jones (4 June 2018) in Halifax.
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some respect? Did they find it novel? Did they find it unsettling? Would 
any of this affect their judgment?
II. The most egregious example, Chief Justice Lamer: Honkies, frogs, 
Chinese gamblers, and Gypsies
In order to highlight the comments voiced by the Supreme Court judges 
at the hearing, their words will be italicized except where it is obvious 
that it is a quotation because the passage is offset by an indentation. Chief 
Justice Antonio Lamer, who found Sparks’ words so biased that he would 
have sent the case back for a new trial, interjected during the hearing 
with statements that were widely understood as racially problematic. The 
Francophone judge from Quebec cut off the lawyers’ submissions to say, 
“To some people I’m a honky, to others I am a frog. …Am I to say that…an 
English policeman arresting a French Canadian, that we take into account 
that there are social tensions right now and factor them into every case?”30 
At first, general laughter greeted the references to “honky” and “frog,” 
perhaps because Lamer CJ was referring to himself. To growing discomfort 
in the courtroom, he then referred to Chinese clients from his earlier law 
practice. The court’s video recording shows Chief Justice Lamer shifting 
his gaze from the lawyers to scan the room. 31 Beside him on the bench, 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé rolled her eyes and swivelled in her chair 
with displeasure. 32
Lamer CJ continued, “For many, many years when I was practising as 
a lawyer, I had clients who were Chinese and the Chinese were very much 
into gambling and they are tremendous gamblers.” He added, “actually—
there is a problem right now in Montreal [with] the casinos on Terre des 
Hommes.” In an apparent attempt at humour, he added that he could take 
“judicial cognizance” of this because “I didn’t go to the casino, I read it 
in the papers.” He remarked that “the casino is constantly occupied by 
people of the Chinese community” and emphasized that “Chinese people 
have a propensity for gambling.” As captured in the video, he continued:
Now, can I take that into account if a Chinese is accused of [pause] I 
don’t know, some illegal gambling, which is not an awful crime, but 
30. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 10-12. Dictionaries describe “honky” as a derogatory term 
used by Blacks to describe whites.
31. Video recording of the oral argument, filed with the Supreme Court of Canada. Laugher is 
evident only after the first two references. The growing discomfort was mentioned in the Interview 
with Yola Grant, supra note 27; Interview with Lynn Jones, supra note 29; Interview with Chantal Tie 
(30 July 2018) in Ottawa; Interview with Michelle Williams (5 June 2018) in Halifax.
32. On Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s pivot, see Interview with Yola Grant, supra note 27. On the strains 
between the two judges, see Constance Backhouse, Claire L’Heureux-Dubé: A Life (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2017).
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anyway some illegal gambling? [smile] Can I factor in that, well, he’s 
Chinese, he says he wasn’t gambling and the police officer is—ah, is 
ah—well, he’s a non-Chinese, and can I factor this in, or start factoring 
in the fact that the non-Chinese police officer might have a bias against 
Chinese people? I understand your argument, and it is a fascinating one, 
but I am just trying to figure out how far down the slope we’re going to 
go once we do this?33
Rodney Small’s counsel, Dianne Pothier, diplomatically did not 
point out that Lamer CJ had just supported a negative stereotype about a 
racialized minority. But his conjecture was not parallel to Judge Sparks’ 
comments. He referred to an entire racialized group. Judge Sparks referred 
to an institutional culture of a specific group of adults in a particular 
occupation. 
Chief Justice Lamer continued to speculate. With his reference to the 
Roma, whom he mislabelled “gypsies,” he further reinforced negative and 
racist stereotypes: 
But what if I take judicial notice of the fact that 95 per cent – and I’m 
saying this and I have no facts, and I wouldn’t want to offend that 
community, but that 95 per cent of gypsies are pick pockets and it’s like 
the Marshall Inquiry, and we have that data, and I am dealing with a pick 
pocket here and assessing the policeman’s credibility. Of course, it is the 
accused and I have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt…but can 
I factor in this judicial notice I have – and I’m not saying that that’s a 
fact.34 
Still later, he added, “What, ah, what if we, we, there is empirical data 
to	the	effect	that	a	certain	ethnic	group	doesn’t	have	great	respect	for	the	
oath?”35 
Sitting in the courtroom behind the lawyers, Black anti-racist activist 
Lynn Jones recalled thinking, “Oh My God. [T]he man’s so racist, so 
blatantly racist. How can he be sitting on the Supreme Court?”36 Asian 
lawyer Chantal Tie, observing from the overflow room, was equally 
“appalled.”37 Black lawyer Michelle Williams was disheartened, wondering 
33. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 20-21. The “Terre des Hommes” reference is audible in the 
video, but the court reporter missed it, and the transcript refers to a single casino in Montreal. The 
pause and smile, neither captured in the transcript, are evident in the video.
34. Ibid at 23.
35. Ibid at 24. For further discussion of the Marshall Inquiry, see below.
36. Interview with Lynn Jones, supra note 29.
37. Interview with Chantal Tie, supra note 31 (co-chair of the legal committee of the intervener 
LEAF).
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“What kind of decision can you expect…when the Chief Justice makes 
racist comments?”38 
Chief Justice Lamer’s questions prompted the Chinese Canadian 
National Council (CCNC) and twenty other social-justice organizations 
to file a formal complaint with the Canadian Judicial Council. The groups 
claimed that when he had described the Chinese “propensity to gamble” 
as a “matter of fact,” he demonstrated an inadequate appreciation of 
racism. They noted that the false stereotype about Chinese gambling and 
criminality, rooted in the nineteenth-century terror of a “yellow peril,” 
had culminated in racist head taxes and the Chinese Exclusion Act. In 
their letter to the Canadian Judicial Council, the CCNC addressed their 
concerns with Lamer CJ’s reasoning:
By putting forward examples of racial stereotype to counter the 
argument that judges should be made aware of the reality of racism, 
the Chief Justice’s reasoning is reflective of a lack of understanding of 
what racism is all about. Racism is about the formation and promotion 
of stereotypes of racialized communities by those in power in order to 
justify discriminatory practices and laws. Judges who acknowledge and 
challenge racism will also have to acknowledge and challenge racial 
stereotypes. But when judges begin to embrace racial stereotypes as facts 
about certain racialized communities, then serious questions must be 
raised about the ability of our judiciary to deliver judgement in an even-
handed manner, particularly when it comes to racial minority groups.39
A spokesperson for the Roma Advocacy Centre stated it also “had a 
problem with Lamer’s statements, even if they were just oral arguments.”40 
The complaint suggested that Chief Justice Lamer should acknowledge 
that his comments had hurt Canadian racialized communities, that he 
should apologize, and that all the Supreme Court judges should undergo 
anti-racism training.41
Robin DiAngelo’s White Fragility has reviewed the responses that 
we, as whites, often display when faced with complaints about racist 
behavior: anger, argumentation, defensiveness, emotional incapacitation, 
withdrawal, and cognitive dissonance.42 Lamer CJ responded with anger 
when the Toronto Star covered the complaint.43 In what the press described 
38. Interview with Michelle Williams, supra note 31.
39. Letter from the CCNC to the Canadian Judicial Council (28 October 1997).
40. “Antonio Lamer: Judge Referred to Chinese as ‘Tremendous Gamblers,’” Toronto Star (4 
November 1997), digital version retrieved with Factiva, Inc., no page number.
41. Letter CCNC to CJC, supra note 39. 
42. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 68, 101.
43. The printed version of the article appeared as Dale Anne Freed, “Top Judge Accused of 
‘Stereotyping,’” Toronto Star (4 November 1997) A25. The digital version, with the same date & 
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as “a spirited written response to The Star,” he called the criticism 
“outrageous” (emphasis in the Star article).44 The outrage of the racialized 
people who sat in his courtroom and the members of the social justice 
organizations who complained was reframed as his outrage over their 
critique of him. Lamer CJ argued that his reference to former Chinese 
clients was past history, although he insisted it was also a depiction of 
reality:
At the time I was practising law in the late ‘50s-early ‘60s, there were 
some Chinese men (Canada had unfair laws at the time as regards the 
immigration of Chinese women) who were very much into gambling. 
This is a fact. It is unfortunate that I used the expression “they are 
tremendous gamblers” as I was referring to the situation at that time. 
Today the profile of the Chinese community in Montreal is completely 
different. If I have offended the Chinese community by a slip of the 
tongue, by the use of “are” instead of “were,” I offer my apologies.45 
(emphasis in the original.)
Taking refuge in “that was then, this is now” is another common 
position for those who respond to complaints of racism.46 The Chief 
Justice insisted that his past assessment was “a fact” at the same time as 
he minimized the impact of the Chinese Exclusion Act, one of the most 
egregious racist statutes in Canadian history, which had barred Chinese 
women and men from immigrating to Canada between 1923 and 1947.47 
The word slippage between “were” and “are” makes clear how intertwined 
the past and the present remained. His remarks about Chinese gambling 
in the Montreal casino were all phrased in the present tense: “there is a 
problem right now in Montreal,” “the casino is constantly occupied by 
people of the Chinese community,” and “Chinese people have a propensity 
for gambling.” 48 (emphasis added.)
headline, omits Freed’s byline, and contains three more paragraphs than in the print version. The 
additional digital material noted that Lamer CJ was one of three dissenting judges, that the Roma 
Advocacy Centre had a problem with his statements, and that the National Action Committee on the 
Status of Women wanted him to step down.
44. Nicolaas Van Rijn, “Chief Justice Denies Attack on Chinese”, Toronto Star (5 November 1997) 
A8.
45. Ibid.
46. Paul Thomas offers one typical illustration: “I didn’t own slaves, and slavery ended in the 
1800s.” “Confronting White Responses to Racism: De-centering Whiteness and White Fragility” (16 
June 2020), online: Medium <medium.com/an-injustice/confronting-white-responses-to-racism-de-
centering-whiteness-and-white-fragility-a9362195d8b4> [perma.cc/79WC-R58U]. DiAngelo, supra 
note 8 at 22 notes that “many whites see racism as a thing of the past.”
47. Backhouse, supra note 11.
48. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 20-21.
192 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The Chief Justice’s reference to “a slip of the tongue” minimized his 
comment, another common pattern of defensive argumentation, as did 
the apology that began, “If I have offended…” It was not a question of 
“if.” In his letter to the Star Lamer CJ insisted that “I did not mean any 
offence,”	later stressing that “It	was	not	in	the	least	intended	to	offend	any	
group.” Such statements are sometimes accepted as an honest and sincere 
response.49 Yet the courts had long ago drawn a distinction between intent 
and harmful impact in anti-discrimination law.50 The law had also made 
finely tuned distinctions between intent, honest mistake, wilful blindness, 
negligence, accident, and incapacity to form intent. Did the Chief Justice 
stop to think about which of the various classifications might apply to him 
before mounting his defence? 
Lamer CJ was on somewhat stronger ground when he defended his 
remarks as “purely hypothetical examples of stereotypes, not factual 
assertions.” 51 When the lawyer Yola Grant expressed concern that he based 
his assumption of a racialized gambling propensity upon his law practice 
experience, he was quick to reply “It was a hypothetical.”52 It was a point 
Lamer CJ made several times in the courtroom.53 In his letter to the Star, 
he added, “I put to (the lawyer) various hypothetical stereotypes for the 
sake of argument, to express my distaste for such stereotypes and to point 
out	what	 I	 felt	was	a	flaw	in	her	reasoning.”54 Jonas Ma, the executive 
director of the CCNC, responded that Lamer had missed the point: “Even 
giving hypothetical examples of stereotypes can reinforce racist images,” 
he explained. 55
The Toronto Star was alarmed by Chief Justice Lamer’s anger. When 
a staff reporter phoned him that evening, Lamer CJ apparently tried to 
alleviate some concern. “Let’s start by saying I don’t intend to sue 
anybody,” he quipped.56 The Star not only accepted the Chief Justice’s 
49. One generous example of this came from Chris Rock, well-known African-American actor and 
comedian, in answer to a question about his reaction to Jimmy Fallon’s earlier appearance in blackface 
on Saturday Night Live. As quoted in Dave Itzkoff, “Chris Rock Tried to Warn Us,” New York Times 
(20 September 2020) AR6, Rock said: “I’m friends with Jimmy. Jimmy’s a great guy. And he didn’t 
mean anything. A lot of people want to say intention doesn’t matter, but it does.” 
50. “A central trend in the development of discrimination law, in every jurisdiction, has been the 
movement from a requirement of intention to ground a complaint to the recognition as actionable 
of indirect or adverse effect discrimination.” Denise G. Réaume, “Harm and Fault in Discrimination 
Law: The Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination” (2001) 2:1 Theor Inq L 349.
51. Van Rijn, supra note 44.
52. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2. 
53. Ibid at 24: “I’m just pretending for—it’s a hypothetical.”
54. Van Rijn, supra note 44.
55. Ibid.
56. Don Sellar, “How the Chief Justice’s Side of the Story Got Mangled,” Toronto Star (8 November 
1997) E2. The staff reporter represented the Star’s “Bureau of Accuracy.”
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excuse that he was “actually giving examples of how wrong stereotyping 
would be,” but also it published an apology on 5 November 1997. The 
paper’s white Ombudsperson, Don Sellar, wrote a column describing 
Lamer as “under attack by the Chinese Canadian National Council and 
20 other ethnocultural groups.” It was a replication of the RDS case itself, 
in which the white officer had turned the questionable arrest of a Black 
youth into a “racist” attack upon himself. It distracted from the harms of 
racism and served as an example of what some anti-racist educators refer 
to as “white-centering.”57 Sellar affirmed Chief Justice Lamer’s words as 
spoken “hypothetically, the way judges often do when they test lawyers’ 
arguments,” and depicted the Chief Justice as “the victim of a journalistic 
mugging.”58 The column was an illustration of the backlash that so often 
greets complaints of racism. 
The phrase “journalistic mugging” seems overblown. The original 
article had simply stated:
Lamer is under attack for calling the Chinese “tremendous gamblers” 
during an appeal before the Supreme Court last March 10. Lamer said 
he was using hypothetical comments when he stated in court that over 
the years many of his clients were Chinese and were “very much into 
gambling.” Later on in the hearing, according to excerpts from a transcript 
of the appeal, Lamer also took shots at another group: “What if I take 
judicial notice of the fact that 95 per cent of gypsies are pickpockets?” 59 
The rest of the article consisted of statements from the aggrieved groups 
that accurately represented their newsworthy concerns.60 The reporter’s 
phrase “took shots” was the one journalistic assessment, tempered with 
the qualification of “hypothetical comments.” 61
Undeterred by the media backlash, the CCNC pressed its complaint 
forward to the Canadian Judicial Council, which was composed of the 
Chief Justices and Associate Chief Justices of Canada’s superior courts. 
The Canadian Judicial Council had the authority to investigate judicial 
misconduct and recommend penalties up to and including removal from 
57. Both Lamer C.J. and Sellar were redirecting the focus toward the harm to the white judge. “Any 
white person responding to racism with an ‘I’ statement is requesting that they and their whiteness (and 
delicate sensibilities) remain centered when the focus should remain on racism and its consequences 
for Black citizens”: Thomas, supra note 46. 
58. Sellar, supra note 56.
59. Identical wording in both the digital and printed versions: Freed, supra note 43.
60. Ibid.
61. It is true that the reporter did not repeat the hypothetical words the Chief Justice had said with 
respect to his negative reference to the Roma. Did that qualify as “journalistic mugging?” The news 
item was reporting on the complaint. The point the complainants were making was that, whether 
hypothetical or not, such comments were harmful.
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office.62 When it was established in 1971, it was accepted that the principle 
of judicial independence meant that only judges could investigate the 
misconduct of other judges. The difficulties inherent in the premise were 
clear in this case. The chair of the Canadian Judicial Council was none 
other than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Antonio 
Lamer. The judge responsible for investigating the complaint was Allan 
McEachern, the white Chief Justice of British Columbia.63 Chief Justice 
McEachern took the precaution of seeking an independent review from a 
white Toronto lawyer.64 However, it is likely this did little to assuage the 
fears of observers about the capacity of the Canadian Judicial Council to 
rule on a matter concerning the top chief justice in Canada. 
The complaint was dismissed in January 1998 after Chief Justice 
McEachern concluded that the complaint was not serious enough to merit 
further consideration, and that Chief Justice Lamer’s remarks “could not 
be characterized as misconduct.” 65 He stated that Chief Justice Lamer’s 
comments were “hypothetical in nature” and made in the “specific 
context of a case” that concerned “matters of race and racial stereotypes 
in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” McEachern emphasized that 
exchanges between counsel and judges were “often wide-ranging, probing 
and exploratory in nature.” 66 Lamer CJ’s hypothetical defence won the day. 
The Montreal casino comments passed without further scrutiny. Although 
there is a distinction between comments delivered during oral submissions 
and a judicial decision, it was a light touch and a far cry from the critical 
eye that was trained on Judge Sparks’ words. Given that Lamer CJ signed 
the dissenting decision that was most critical of the Youth Court judge, 
the gentle treatment here must have struck some observers as particularly 
unsettling.
62. Canadian Judicial Council, “The work of the Council,” online: Canadian Judicial Council 
<www.cjc-ccm.ca/en/what-we-do> [https://perma.cc/72CL-8YMZ].
63. Complaints were first heard by the chair or vice chair of the Judicial Conduct Committee. Due 
to his position as Vice-Chair of the CJC, McEachern CJ chaired its Judicial Conduct Committee. If he 
considered a complaint serious enough to merit further consideration, he could refer it to a panel of up 
to five committee members who could decide whether a public inquiry was needed. Correspondence 
from Jeannie Thomas, Executive Director of the CJC, to Dr. Alan Li, President of the CCNC (22 
January 1998), CJC Archives File 97-120.
64. Toronto lawyer Eleanor Cronk conducted the independent review; Cronk was appointed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in 2001.
65. Canadian Judicial Council, Annual Report 1997–1998, online: Canadian Judicial Council 
<https://cjc-ccm.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_annualreport_1997-1998_en.pdf> [https://perma.
cc/4Z4G-QYWY] at 22.
66. Canadian Judicial Council news release (23 January 1998); Correspondence from Thomas to Li, 
supra note 63.
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Chief Justice McEachern claimed to “understand the sensitivities that 
generated” the complaint, and regretted that the “CCNC feels aggrieved 
by the statements,” but emphasized Lamer CJ’s unintentional motivation. 
He noted that the “spirited argument between counsel and the Court can 
sometimes create misunderstanding or cause hurt that is no less painful 
for its being unintended. When this occurs, it is much to be regretted, 
but judges must be free to test lawyers’ submissions with hypothetical 
questions” and “to engage in frank and wide-ranging discussion.”67 
McEachern CJ’s insistence that all such questions were open season, 
necessary for full and frank judicial analysis, amounted to a blanket 
approval of hypothetical comments—racially based or otherwise. It 
failed to inquire why Chief Justice Lamer had selected these particular 
hypotheticals, and what those choices might signify about his beliefs. 
The Canadian Judicial Council should have delved more deeply into the 
stereotypes—that Chinese people gamble, that Roma people steal, that 
“ethnics” lie on the stand—asking other important questions: What is the 
source of the presumption? Who is applying it? Who is it harming? It failed 
to consider whether some hypothetical statements might be so offensive 
they should not be used for jousting practice. According to the Canadian 
Judicial Council, probing statements that contained racist stereotypes 
were acceptable. Jonas Ma’s concerns that hypothetical racist stereotypes 
fostered racism were dismissed. 
III. The professional culture of whiteness
As white lawyers and judges, many of us live our lives primarily within a 
“white bubble,” raised in families, schools, neighbourhoods, workplaces, 
and social circles largely confined to white people. While insensitivity to 
racism is not an inevitable consequence, for most of us the experiential 
gap means that we are not well-equipped to assess racism claims. It is 
impossible to know from the available records whether the nine Supreme 
Court judges in the RDS case had any significant exposure to racialized 
communities, but we do know that these nine judges studied in mostly 
white educational institutions, they practised in predominantly white law 
firms and government offices, and they sat on all-white courts.68 
67. Ibid.
68. A volume of essays on Chief Justice Lamer’s life and career (b.1933, d.2007) describes personal 
and professional circles that were overwhelmingly white, although one can surmise that his early 
criminal defence practice in Montreal may have included some racialized clients. He studied law at 
the University of Montreal, practised with Philip Cutler and Jacques Bellemare, and served as a judge 
from 1969. Justice John (Jack) Major (b.1931) studied law at the University of Toronto and practised 
as a corporate-commercial litigator and senior partner at the elite Alberta law firm of Bennett, Jones, 
Verchere, where his clients included the Calgary Police and physicians at the Canadian Medical 
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Robin DiAngelo points out that segregation may make racial disparities 
“difficult for whites to see and easy to deny.”69 Although most Canadians 
look with disparagement upon our American neighbours for their historic 
and on-going racial segregation, many of us move within similar white 
spaces without much reflection on our own situation. The Supreme Court 
that heard the RDS case might itself be aptly characterized as a segregated 
white space.70 Did any of the top court judges recognize that they sat on a 
segregated all-white bench? If they had, would they have recognized the 
implications? Describing what this means for all-white neighbourhoods, 
DiAngelo explains:
Predominantly white neighbourhoods are not outside of race—they 
are teeming with race. Every moment we spend in those environments 
reinforces powerful aspects of the white racial frame, including a limited 
worldview, a reliance on deeply problematic depictions of people of 
color, comfort in segregation with no sense that there might be value 
Protective Association. Justice Major had been a judge since 1991. Justice John Sopinka (b.1933, 
d.1997), the first Ukrainian-Canadian on the court, studied law at the University of Toronto, and 
practised with the elite Toronto firms of Faskin & Calvin and Stikeman Elliott for twenty-eight years 
before moving directly from practice to the all-white Supreme Court in 1988. Justice Peter deCarteret 
Cory (b.1925, d.2020) studied law at Osgoode Hall, and practised civil litigation with the Toronto firm 
of Holden Murdoch while active with a number of lawyers’ professional associations. He had been a 
judge since 1974. Justice Frank Iacobucci (b.1937), the first Italian-Canadian judge on the top court, 
studied law at the University of British Columbia and Cambridge University, practised corporate law 
at an elite New York City firm, and then joined the University of Toronto where he taught business and 
tax law and rose to become Dean and Vice-President, before becoming Deputy Minister of Justice in 
Ottawa. He had been a judge since 1988. Justice Gérard Vincent La Forest (b.1926) studied law at the 
University of New Brunswick, Oxford, and Yale, taught law in New Brunswick, Alberta, and Ontario, 
and served as Assistant Deputy Attorney General of Canada. He had been a judge since 1981. Justice 
Charles Doherty Gonthier (b.1928, d.2009) studied law at McGill, and practised law in Montreal from 
1952 to 1974, when he became a judge. Throughout his career, he remained active within lawyers’ 
and judges’ professional organizations. The biography of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé describes a 
life and career largely devoid of non-white influences. Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin mentions in 
her memoir the presence of some Indigenous people in rural Alberta where she grew up, but few non-
white influences thereafter. Biographies of all nine judges, Supreme Court of Canada, online: <www.
scc-csc.ca> [https://perma.cc/5ZE5-GVXR]; Adam Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds, The Sacred Fire: The 
Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Chief Justice of Canada) (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2009); Lionel D 
Smith, Ruled by Law: Essays in Memory of Mr. Justice John Sopinka (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000); 
Sean Fine, “Supreme Court Judge Peter Cory ‘Was Legendary For His Kindness,’” Toronto Globe & 
Mail (1 May 2020), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/BZZ4-349Y]; Backhouse, supra 
note 32; Beverley McLachlin, Truth Be Told: My Journey Through Life and the Law (Toronto: Simon 
& Schuster, 2019).   
69. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 23.
70. Two of the nine judges had been publicly acknowledged for their ethnic heritage, John Sopinka J 
the first Ukrainian and Frank Iacobucci J the first Italian on the top court. Nineteenth-century Canadians 
of Ukrainian and Italian backgrounds, then categorized as “racially” distinct, faced considerable 
discrimination and exclusion from the classification of “white” in certain geographic areas. These 
once disparaged “foreign” ethnicities had been largely integrated into the white category by the time 
of Justices Sopinka and Iacobucci’s appointments in the late twentieth-century. Backhouse, supra note 
12.
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in knowing people of color, and internalized superiority. In turn, our 
capacity to engage constructively across racial lines becomes profoundly 
limited. 71 (emphasis in the original.) 
The judges’ individual interactions with police officers would also 
have been mediated by their professional status as lawyers and judges. For 
these judges, the risks of being street-checked, stopped and frisked, having 
their homes or vehicles searched, or being wrongly arrested were minimal. 
Due to his earlier stint as a criminal defence lawyer, Chief Justice Lamer 
may have had greater knowledge about police wrong-doing than his 
colleagues with their corporate law and civil litigation backgrounds, but 
his race, class, and professional stature insulated him personally. 72 Indeed, 
Lamer CJ was fond of boasting that he could speed as fast as he wished 
on the highway between Ottawa and Montreal. Police cruisers would see 
him driving well over the limit, come after him with their lights flashing, 
catch sight of his Chief Justice of Canada licence plates, and abandon the 
chase.73 
In theory, ongoing judicial training that incorporated information 
about racism—conscious, unconscious, individual, institutional, and 
systemic—might have helped to rectify some tunnel-view perspectives. 
But common law judges have traditionally been averse to judicial 
education. The earliest courses, in the 1970s, were a patchwork of skills 
training and doctrinal updates run by volunteer judges for the few judges 
who volunteered to attend. In 1994, the Canadian Judicial Council’s 
innovative recommendation for “social context” programming about 
gender and race stirred up storms of controversy. Many judges insisted 
that such courses could be a cover for attitudinal indoctrination by interest 
groups, a violation of judicial independence. Chief Justice Lamer led the 
early opposition, rejecting mandatory education, insisting that only judges 
could design and deliver the material, and expressing concern that the 
training must not be used “as a vehicle for indoctrination of any kind.” 74 
71. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 37.
72. Michel Robert, the Chief Justice of Quebec, reflected upon Chief Justice Lamer’s law practice 
in the late 1950s, stating that “with respect to police conduct towards the accused, we’ll say, to be 
elegant, that it lacked monitoring.” Although Robert CJ followed up by stating that Lamer was “deeply 
affected by the injustices of the system at that time,” it was an extraordinary admission, couched in an 
attempt at humour, from the province’s Chief Justice. The Hon. JJ Michel Robert, “Antonio Lamer: 
The Man, His Life and Times” in Dodek & Jutras, supra note 68 at 4.
73. Backhouse, supra note 32 at 339, 642.
74. Antonio Lamer, “The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in Times 
of Change” (1996) 45 UNB LJ at 15; Antonio Lamer, “Social Context Education” (1997) 10 National 
Judicial Institute Bulletin 1; Backhouse, supra note 32 at 505-507; Rosemary Cairns Way & T Brettel 
Dawson, “Taking a Stand on Equality” in Kim Brooks ed, Judging Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s 
Difference (Toronto: UBC Press, 2009) at 278-289.
198 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Effective social context judicial education might have gone some distance 
toward lessening the “white bubble” perspectives of Lamer CJ and the 
court over which he presided.
IV. The dilemma of deference 
The judicial environment exacerbated the problems. The challenging task 
of assessing evidence and applying legal rules requires that judges develop 
a strong sense of independent self-confidence. Failure to do so can foster 
uncertainty, anxiety, and incapacitation. Yet the confidence essential for 
judging can also reduce recognition of personal limitations and inculcate 
a sense of superiority that results in rudeness, suspicion of outsiders, 
narcissism, and what some have termed “judge-itis.” 
When the nine black-robed, white-tabbed RDS justices filed in from 
their separate entrance to take their seats on high-backed red-leather 
chairs, the court clerk shouted “All rise!” Traditional protocols hammered 
home the hierarchical structures from the moment of entry. Everyone in 
the room remained standing until the judges were seated on a platform 
high above the rest. Lawyers bow to judges upon entering and exiting 
the courtroom; they never turn their backs because doing so is deemed 
disrespectful. Lawyers laugh at all the judges’ jokes, even ones that might 
receive blank stares in other venues. That day Chief Justice Lamer offered 
bland comments, then stopped to grin, and the audience responded with 
laughter.75
Lawyers speak of “this Honourable Court.” The traditional forms of 
judicial address that were in use in 1994—“My Lords and My Ladies” 
—are reminiscent of peasant-serfs addressing nobility.76 When lawyers 
speak, they begin with “I submit” or “We submit,” to reflect the superior 
status of the judge. Observers in the courtroom suffer other restrictions. 
Certain hats, clothes, and gum-chewing present expellable offences. In a 
race-based case involving the prosecution of Black activist Dudley Laws in 
Toronto in 1994, with a courtroom filled with Black observers, an African-
Canadian was ordered out for refusing to remove his Muslim prayer cap.77 
75. Laughter ensued even after Rocky Jones merely requested that the court “grant” the articling 
clerks an opportunity to sit at the counsel table. Chief Justice Lamer said “Yes, granted,” and smirked. 
Laughter then broke out. Video recording, supra note 31; Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 1.
76. When the court was established, Lord Dufferin recommended the title of “Lord Justice” to 
reinforce the status of the new tribunal; James C Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court 
of Canada: History of the Institution (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1985) at 23. The court website 
currently recommends the title of “Justice.” online: SCC <https://www.scc-csc.ca/contact/faq/qa-qr-
eng.aspx#f10> [https://perma.cc/7QLX-4A6F]. The RDS lawyers chose to use “My Lords and My 
Ladies.”
77. Asserting his “duty to oversee the solemnity and dignity that must prevail,” the trial judge 
ordered Michael Taylor, a spectator and supporter of Dudley Laws, to remove his prayer cap or 
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When the overflow Black crowd in the RDS courtroom spontaneously 
exclaimed “amen” when they agreed with statements made by counsel, 
they were met with brusque threats of ejection.78 
The obsequiousness showered on judges in court is on a different 
plane from other office-holders. Rocky Jones replied to a comment by 
Justice Gérard La Forest, by saying “Thank you very much, you’re so 
much better than I am.” 79 Crown counsel Robert Lutes retorted “Why?” to 
a question from the Chief Justice, and then jumped to add, “I don’t mean 
to be flip—you know, I’m sorry. It was the heat of the moment.”80 When 
the lawyers responded to the judges’ queries, they did so gently. It was 
apparently unthinkable, a strategic error, to tell a judge outright that she 
or he was wrong. It could risk angering the judge and damaging a client’s 
case. Delicate disagreement, politely phrased, was the only recourse. 81 
None of the lawyers affronted by Chief Justice Lamer’s interjections 
felt they could call out the racial biases. No one pointed out that hypotheses 
about gambling Chinese were part of a dreadful Canadian history of racism 
—a “prevalent attitude of the day” to use Judge Sparks’ words.82 No one 
suggested that hateful ideas about the Roma had long kept them from 
employment, housing, and social mobility in Canada and other countries.83 
As lawyer April Burey told the court, her team had been unable to find any 
previous case where a judge’s decision had been appealed for racial bias. 
leave the courtroom. The judge drew a distinction between Mr. Taylor’s head covering and those of 
“adherents of a well established and recognizable race, culture, national or religious community.” 
The Ontario Court of Appeal later ruled that the judge had erred “in suggesting that only certain 
communities are clearly within the purview of the Charter.” A subsequent complaint to the Canadian 
Judicial Council resulted in an expression of disapproval over the trial judge’s comments, but no 
further disciplinary action. R v Laws (1998), 41 OR (3d) 499, 165 DLR (4th) 301 (CA) [Laws]. 
See also Rosalind Raymond, “Anti-Cop Brutality Activist Dudley Laws Wins Victory Over Police 
Frame-Up,” The Militant (16 November 1998), online: <www.themilitant.com/1998/6241/6241_18.
html> [perma.cc/93FJ-TYUK]; Letter to the Editor, “Quebec Judge’s Hijab Ruling Inflammatory,” 
Toronto Star (7 March 2015), online: Toronto Star <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/letters_to_the_
editors/2015/03/07/quebec-judges-hijab-ruling-inflammatory.html> [https://perma.cc/7UGM-NSJD]. 
78. Interview with Lynn Jones, supra note 29; Jones & Walker, supra note 26 at 203.
79. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 16.
80. Ibid at 67.
81. Backhouse, supra note 32 at chapter 35, documents a race-based case, Baker v Canada, 1999 
SCC 699, [Baker], where the only Black lawyer in the Supreme Court hearing chose not to raise 
relevant racism issues because he feared it would be harmful to his client.
82. Backhouse, supra note 11 at chapter 5.
83. Maureen Brosnahan, “Roma Refugees Victims of Systemic Discrimination in Canada, Report 
Finds,” CBC News (2 April 2015), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/roma-refugees-
victims-of-systemic-discrimination-in-canada-new-report-finds-1.3018837> [perma.cc/J3MT-
2RQK]; Sean Rehaag et al, “No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee Claimants in Canada” (2015) 
52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ; Cynthia Levine Rasky, “‘They Didn’t Treat Me as a Gypsy’: Romani Refugees 
in Toronto” (2016) 32:3 Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees at 54 citing rampant discrimination 
and violence against the Roma.
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“Perhaps,” she speculated, “our difficulty arose because of the assumption 
or recognition that judges make difficult decisions in good faith.” Then 
she added, more directly, “Also, lawyers are schooled in deference to 
judges and thus do not appeal on reasonable apprehension of bias.”84 
The complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council came from social justice 
organizations. As hard-hitting as it was, even the complaint never used the 
word “racist.” 
Hierarchical practices of deference serve as an important recognition 
of the stature of judicial office and the courts, of respect for the law and 
the legal system. Yet for those who experience Canadian legal institutions 
as systematically unfair, these elaborate mannerisms must seem not 
only quaint, but also downright problematic. Moreover, the customary 
deference is not always extended to outsider members of the judiciary. 
Early white female judges faced insubordination from lawyers and court 
staff. 85 And prosecutor Miller interrupted Judge Sparks five times during 
Rodney Small’s trial; the last intervention came in the middle of her 
decision, to remind her of an earlier statement he had made.86 
The legal culture of deference on full display in the Supreme Court 
hearing meant that none of the lawyers confronted Chief Justice Lamer 
over his racist expressions. Nor is this case anomalous. The probability is 
that white Supreme Court judges have never been confronted with open 
accusations of racial bias from counsel inside their courtroom. It makes 
inquiries such as this one urgent, written after the fact by scholars who do 
not represent clients, freer to engage in direct critique.
V. Facing	the	racial	firing	line
The final portion of this paper will examine the additional interjections 
of the three judges who wrote the dissenting opinion most critical of 
Judge Sparks. Unlike the majority, which upheld Judge Sparks’ acquittal 
(although not without words of critique), the dissenting judges would have 
sent the case back for a new trial. Justice Major wrote the dissent. Chief 
Justice Lamer and Justice Sopinka co-signed it. Collectively they found 
84. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 48.
85. Emily Murphy, Canada’s first female police magistrate, appointed in Edmonton in 1916, was 
challenged by counsel who claimed she had no jurisdiction because women were not “persons” under 
the law: Byrne Hope Sanders, Emily Murphy: Crusader (Toronto: Macmillan, 1945) at 142-143. 
Justice Mabel Van Camp, the second woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Ontario in 1971, was 
refused parking in the judges’ lot by the security guard: Obituary, William Illsey Atkinson “I Am The 
Damn Judge,” Globe & Mail (9 August 2012) at R5.
86. Trial Transcript, supra note 13, interruptions twice at 30, and once at 31, 50, and 80. During her 
oral delivery of the decision, Judge Sparks had noted that the ride-along witness was not in court to 
corroborate Stienburg’s evidence. Miller interrupted: “Your Honour, that’s the person who I advised 
earlier was in the hospital and was in a coma.” “I see, okay, thank you Mr. Miller,” she replied. 
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that Judge Sparks’ words raised a reasonable apprehension of racial bias 
sufficient to invalidate her decision.87 
Justice John (Jack) Major was the first to interrupt Rocky Jones’s 
submission. Jones had stated that the allegation of bias arose because “Judge 
Sparks, a Black woman, was adjudicating the trial of a Black accused 
and she explicitly recognized that the case had racial overtones.” Justice 
Major interjected, “Isn’t that stereotyping that seems so out of favour these 
days?”88 His query exemplified a pattern that often occurs when white 
racism has been identified—a condemnation of all racial assumptions. 
In this case, it was a condemnation of the stereotype that a white officer 
had overreacted to a Black teenager. This common response claims that 
all racial stereotypes deserve condemnation as evil—that here, if it was 
wrong to assume that Black teenagers were dangerous then it would also 
be wrong to assume that white police overreact. DiAngelo has observed 
that whites often meet a challenge of racism by insisting that assumptions 
should never be drawn. “Now you are the transgressor” appears to be a 
reflexive reaction.89 This constitutes an inversion that serves to destabilize 
the initial claim of racism. Ijeoma Oluo describes it as a defensive attempt 
“either to move the conversation to a place where the [white person] is 
more comfortable, or to end the conversation completely.”90
For example, those who respond to slogans such as “Black Lives 
Matter” with banners reading “All Lives Matter,” “White Lives Matter,” 
and “Blue Lives Matter,” offer an instructive parallel. There are dramatic 
imbalances in the number of Blacks injured and killed by police. The catch-
phrase is simply a way to say Black Lives Matter too; it never inserts the 
word “Only” at the front. Of course, white lives matter, police lives matter, 
all lives matter. But the retort sideswipes the conversation, disrupting the 
focus on the immediate problem of anti-Black racism. It is also, asserts 
Ibram Kendi, an illustration of an insidious pattern where claims of racism 
against minority groups are met with claims of anti-white racism.91
87. While Major J, Lamer CJ, and Sopinka J’s decision did not carry the day, Justices Peter Cory and 
Frank Iacobucci wrote a separate opinion holding that Judge Sparks’ remarks had been “worrisome 
and came very close to the line,” but did not meet the high standard of reasonable apprehension of 
bias. Because four other Justices, Beverley McLachlin, Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Gérard La Forest, and 
Charles Gonthier found that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, Rodney Small’s acquittal 
was restored. RDS, supra note 1.
88. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 5.
89. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 119-120, 128. Emphasis in the original.
90. Oluo, supra note 7 at 33.
91. Kendi, supra note 9 at 130-131: “In 2015, former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani called 
the [Black Lives Matter] movement ‘inherently racist.’ …Ideas not centering white lives are [defined 
as] racist. …Embattled police officers who can’t imagine losing their rights to racially profile and 
brutalize respond with ‘Blue Lives Matter.’”
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Chief Justice Lamer objected that stereotypes might cause the 
following: 
Say, well, all young Blacks are suspect of stealing cars, and why they 
steal cars is because they don’t have money, why they don’t have money 
is because they don’t have jobs, and why they don’t have jobs is because 
they’re Black and they’re being discriminated against. And then you 
conclude, well, it’s more likely that a young non-white or Black person 
or Afro-Canadian or Afro-American is going to steal a car. If a police 
officer says he caught him stealing a car—I’m afraid it’s going to start 
working both ways…92
There was no apparent recognition that this was exactly the situation 
that many Blacks experience within the criminal justice system—with 
policing, charging, prosecuting, and judging, as documented by a plethora 
of studies and commissions of inquiry.93 To suggest that taking cognizance 
of anti-Black racism was harmful because it might lead to white judges 
exhibiting bias against Blacks was to erase the lived reality of Blacks. 
Lamer CJ had set up the hypothetical under the assumption that white 
judges were operating free of racial bias. As DiAngelo writes, white 
defensiveness supports the “delusion that we are objective individuals,” 
and protects our “deep investment in a system that benefits us and that we 
have been conditioned to see as fair.”94 The erasure of white privilege also 
ensures that we continue to perceive white judges as neutral and Black 
judges as less so. It was no accident that the first case of judicial racial bias 
to reach the Supreme Court was directed at a Black judge. 
Anti-racist educators have documented patterns that distract and 
deflect discussions about racism.95 Reni Eddo-Lodge notes that “the 
ubiquitous politics of race…operates on its inherent invisibility.”96 The 
choice of words is one signal. Ijeoma Oluo explains that we live in a society 
where talking about race is “not something you ‘do’ in polite society,” 
92. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 21-22.
93. AK Warner & KE Renner, “Research on the Halifax Criminal Courts: A Technical and Conceptual 
Report” (1978), cited in Philip Girard, Jim Phillips & Barry Cahill, eds, The Supreme Court of Nova 
Scotia, 1754–2004 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 187-188; Royal Commission on 
the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1989), vol 7, Consultative 
Conference Transcript of Proceedings (1989), vol 4: Discrimination against Blacks in Nova Scotia: 
The Criminal Justice System: A Research Study 1989; Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism 
in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queens’ Printer, 1995); Report of the Aboriginal 
Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991); Report of the Task Force on the Criminal 
Justice System and Its Impact on Indian and Métis People of Alberta (Edmonton: Government of 
Alberta, 1991).
94. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 100.
95. Oluo, supra note 7 at 209.
96. Eddo-Lodge, supra note 10 at xiv.
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and so we lack “practice in putting words to racial issues.”97 Most of us 
prefer phrases such as “race relations,” “racial issues” “racial diversity,” 
and “racial insensitivity” rather than the clearer term “racism.” In some 
of his interjections, Chief Justice Lamer took the choice of evasive words 
to extremes, referring to “an ethnic group who is disadvantaged,” and 
the peculiar “racially inclined.”98 After his hypothetical about an ethnic 
group without respect for the oath, the Chief Justice then redirected the 
discussion away from racism entirely. With smiles and quiet chuckles—
again to general laughter—he went into a long list of the groups known 
to mislead trial judges: witnesses, police officers, accused. He added 
jocularly “I like to think that lawyers would mislead the court less often,” 
and further, “it has been known that some judges have misled the courts, 
unfortunately.”99 It was a side-tracking of the crucial debate about racism. 
White fragility is marked by defensiveness over any attempt to talk 
openly about race.100 The deleterious reprimand that the majority of the 
RDS judges delivered to Judge Sparks and any other Black judges who 
might follow her encompassed a warning that explicit reference to racist 
actions would lead to censure. This is in direct opposition to the advice 
of Ibram X Kendi, who insists that racism is not the worst word in the 
English language. Instead he states that racism “is descriptive, and the 
only way to undo racism is to consistently identify and describe it.”101 
Lamer CJ’s further statement, “I don’t usually refer to people’s colour, 
unless I intend to make something of it” reflects the view held by many 
whites, that because racism is bad, we should insist that we do not notice 
race.102 Such statements come in a variety of forms: “Race has no meaning 
to me. I don’t care if you are green, purple, or polka-dot. I don’t see colour.” 
Or even, as DiAngelo mentions in her American book White Fragility, 
“I’m not racist, I’m from Canada.” Yet, as she notes, because historical 
and current realities have placed us inside societies riven by racism, it 
is “impossible to completely escape problematic racial assumptions,” 
and people who claim they are not prejudiced demonstrate a “profound 
lack of self-awareness.” 103 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva explains that the myth 
97. Oluo, supra note 7 at 14.
98. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 11, 24.
99. Ibid at 6; Video Recording, supra note 31.
100. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 42.
101. Kendi, supra note 9 at 9, adding at 46-47, “Only Racists Shy Away From the R-word—Racism 
is Steeped in Denial.”
102. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 11. Lamer did not explain what he meant by the phrase 
“unless I intend to make something of it,” leaving it unclear when he thought it was correct to “make 
something of it.”
103. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 4, 19, 77.
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of “colour-blindness” leads many of us to deny the unavoidable reality 
of racism, and underscores our lack of understanding about what racism 
is. As the first lesson of anti-racism education emphasizes, everyone has 
prejudice and everyone discriminates. A racism-free perspective is an 
illusion.104 Eddo-Lodge notes that “insisting that we just don’t see race…
silence[s] people of colour attempting to articulate the racism we face.”105 
Kendi adds that it is ridiculous to suggest that racism will miraculously 
go away if we stop identifying race. If we stop using racial categories, he 
adds, “then we will not be able to identify racist policies” and the result 
will be “a world of inequity none of us can see.”106 
Chief Justice Lamer conceded that, while he might not be personally 
implicated, it was “an obvious proposition that there is racism.” 107 Later, 
he would try to reassure Rodney Small’s lawyers. “We are talking about 
racism	and	I	am	very	sympathetic	to	your	argument.	We	are	in	a	different	
world and we are becoming a very diverse society,” he said with a 
smile.108 There was no explicit recognition of the devastating legacy from 
the long history of Canadian racism, just a comment that late twentieth-
century immigration had ushered in a new “diversity.” In response to the 
Crown’s admission that racism existed in Canada, Justice Major was less 
accommodating. “Well,” he answered, “let’s assume that it does—for the 
purpose of this discussion.”109 
Even supposing it did, Justice Major was not prepared to jump from 
racism in Canada to Judge Sparks’ comments. He insisted that there was 
“no evidence on which she could rely” that “race played a part,” other 
than	 her	 own	 conclusions	 that	 “police	 officers	 overreact	when	 dealing	
with non-white groups.”110 Justice John Sopinka, considered Canada’s 
greatest expert on the law of evidence, echoed his colleague’s insistence 
that there was “no evidence.”111 Posing a slippery slope analysis, he 
queried whether other judges would have to adopt Sparks’ approach: 
“So	 that	 in	 every	 case	a	police	officer,	 in	 similar	 circumstances,	would	
104. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of 
Racial Inequality in America (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017) at 66; DiAngelo, supra 
note 8 at 19-20, 68.
105. Eddo-Lodge, supra note 10 at 81, 83. Emphasis in original.
106. Kendi, supra note 9 at 54.
107. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 10-12.
108. Ibid at 23, Video Recording, supra note 31.
109. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 60-61.
110. Ibid at 5.
111. Ibid at 8. He had co-authored Sidney N Lederman & John Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Civil 
Cases (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) and John Sopinka, Sidney N Lederman & Alan W Bryant, The 
Law of Evidence in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992). The latter was described as “the leading 
text on the law of evidence”: McLachlin, supra note 68 at 259.
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start	off	with	a	presumption	 that	he	either	overreacted	or	didn’t	behave	
properly?112 Sopinka J was hypothesizing a new reality where trial judges 
would routinely frame their scrutiny of police testimony against a general 
recognition about the patterns of racism in police-Black interactions. It 
seems to have struck him as absurd. Yet Blacks might have retorted that 
for centuries white judges had started with an implicit assumption that 
police officers had no reason to lie on the stand, particularly when faced 
with conflicting evidence from Black witnesses. In fact, the white Crown 
prosecutor had made a similar submission at trial. Rick Miller had argued, 
“[T]here’s absolutely no reason to attack the credibility of the officer. His 
explanation was straight forward. He was simply doing his lawful duty 
and carrying out the arrest.” 113 It may have been one of the things that 
prompted Judge Sparks to issue the decision she did.114 
After dismissing the wider vistas of systemic racism, Sopinka J, Lamer 
CJ, and Major J shifted downward to the realm of the individual officer. 
The discussion switched from whether anti-Black racism had played a 
role in Rodney Small’s chokehold and arrest to questions about Officer 
Stienburg: a pattern that has been described as “white-centering.”115 It was 
also a cue that the three judges understood racism as discrete, isolated 
acts of prejudice committed by individuals, rather than as complex, 
interconnected patterns. “The question here,” Justice Sopinka emphasized, 
“is whether or not [the presumption] can be applied to the particular facts 
of the case?”116 Lamer CJ homed in on Officer Stienburg: “We have to 
decide whether this one was racist. …But we don’t know which ones are 
unless they do things to reveal it, and the smarter ones don’t.”117 Major J 
asked for evidence to “show	racism	on	the	part	of	the	police	officer.	Were	
there events where he acted in a racist way? What is there available by 
way of evidence other than things like studies which are general? What is 
the value of the studies of the population in general, looking at the conduct 
of	a	specific	individual?	How	do	you	bring	the	results	of	[a]	study	down	to	
a single individual policeman? You have to show evidence that something 
in his past, or somebody at the incident told it.”118 
The dismissal of the value of studies into racism was particularly 
surprising. The Marshall Report on the wrongful conviction of Donald 
112. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 41.
113. Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 76-78.
114. Justice Cory suggested this; RDS, supra note 1 at 547.
115. Thomas, supra note 46.
116. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 62.
117. Ibid at 10. Emphasis from the video.
118. Ibid at 59-61.
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Marshall, Jr. had been released only a few years earlier. In 1989, the Royal 
Commission headed by three chief justices had uncovered appalling racist 
treatment of an Indigenous man by the police, the lawyers, and the judges 
of Nova Scotia, and also found what Nova Scotia criminologist Donald 
Clairmont later described as “a long legacy of negative Police-Black 
relationships in Nova Scotia.”119 The surveys the Royal Commission 
conducted found Nova Scotian respondents overwhelmingly agreed that 
“discrimination against blacks was an observable fact.” Both legally- and 
non-legally trained respondents “expressed concern with alleged police 
harassment” and reported that the police were “not very tolerant” when 
dealing with young Blacks. The Report concluded that “the hostility of 
many Blacks to the police, and apparently of many police toward Blacks” 
was “well documented.”120 
Chief Justice Lamer had even referred to the Marshall Inquiry in his 
hypothetical interjections. If shocking studies like this were irrelevant in 
assessing a Halifax police officer’s apparent overreaction, the requisite 
standard of proof had been set impossibly high. The discussion had slipped 
a long way from assessing evidence of wrongful arrest. It was as though the 
police officer himself was under criminal charges for intentional racism.
Indeed, the focus had shifted far from whether the chokehold and 
handcuffs on a Black teenager was an overreaction to nosey-ness, 
and whether the discretionary obstruction charges were retaliation for 
talking back. Instead, the judges inquired whether the officer’s intent and 
119. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, vol 1, Findings and 
Recommendations (December 1989) and vol 4, Discrimination against Blacks in Nova Scotia: 
The Criminal Justice System, A Research Study; Don Clairmont & Ethan Kim, “Getting Past the 
Gatekeepers: The Reception of Restorative Justice in the Nova Scotian Criminal Justice System” 
(2013) 36:2 Dal LJ at 370. An earlier 1978 study on summary conviction first-time offenders showed 
23 per cent of whites discharged and 77 per cent sentenced; none of the Blacks was discharged and 
all were sentenced. Warner and Renner, supra note 93 at 187-188. Several decades later, University 
of Toronto criminologist Scot Wortley’s research would document a startling over-representation of 
Blacks in Halifax police street checks. Dr Scot Wortley, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Street Checks Report 
(Halifax: Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, 2019). Wortley concluded: “The police are much 
more likely to level criminal charges against Blacks for lower-level criminal events. Young people 
will defy or question an officer, and the officer will use force and say they were threatened. We call 
it ‘contempt of cop’ situations. Then [the young Blacks] face discretionary charges such as obstruct 
justice, assault police.” Interview with Scot Wortley (28 November 2019) in Toronto. See also Report 
on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: December 1995); Report of 
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991); Report of the Task Force 
on the Criminal Justice System and Its Impact on Indian and Métis People of Alberta (Edmonton: 
Government of Alberta, 1991); Clayton James Mosher, Discrimination and Denial: Systemic Racism 
in Ontario’s Legal and Criminal Justice Systems, 1892-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1998); David M Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin, 2006); 
Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives (Blackpoint, Nova Scotia: Fernwood, 2017).
120. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, supra note 119 at 17, 26, 49-50. 
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motivation were based on race.121 They had failed to grasp that the issue 
was not whether the individual officer had racist motivations but whether 
he misperceived the dangers and risks connected with Rodney Small. 
Research has demonstrated that whites perceive danger simply because 
of the presence of Black people, and that “we cannot trust our perceptions 
when it comes to race and crime.”122 Had the cultural and social perceptions 
of the police magnified the threat of an unarmed fifteen-year-old on a 
bike into a potentially injurious assault on a SWAT team officer? Had the 
cultural and social perceptions of white judges done the same? 
Justice Sopinka even suggested that Judge Sparks had a responsibility 
to canvas other valid reasons for police overreaction: “[S]he doesn’t try 
to	find	some	legitimate	explanation.	…[W]hy	would	this	person	[Officer	
Stienburg]—what would this person’s motive be to lie?”123 The word “lie” 
had never appeared in Judge Sparks’ decision. She said: “I’m not saying 
that the Constable has misled the Court,” and “I believe that probably the 
situation in this particular case is the case of a young police officer who 
overreacted.”124 The job of a trial judge is to determine whether the Crown 
has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Sparks did not need 
to find the officer had lied, and she did not. Sopinka’s jump to questioning 
the officer’s motive to “lie” was an over-attribution, another reflection of 
white defensiveness.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Lamer’s comment that “bias is never fair” 
may be a comforting thought, but it is premised upon the invisibility of 
pernicious biases that we all labour under, most of them tied to prevailing 
realities that position the races on unequal planes. 125 The lessons that can 
be drawn from scrutinizing the appellate judges’ ideas here are ones that 
all of us need to incorporate if we aspire to disabuse ourselves of racist 
notions. The judges’ interjections and questions in the RDS case reveal 
much about white judicial thinking. Their informal conversation offers an 
instructive comparison with Judge Sparks’ carefully worded comments 
121. Oluo, supra note 7 at 89: The focus on individual officers denies the existence of systemic racism. 
“[I]nstead of a system plagued by unchecked implicit bias, inadequate training, lack of accountability, 
racist quotas, cultural insensitivity, lack of diversity, and lack of transparency, we are told we have 
a collection of individuals doing their best to serve and protect outside of a few bad applies acting 
completely on their own, and there’s nothing we can do about it other than address those bad apples 
once it’s been thoroughly proven that the officer in question is indeed a bad apple.” Chris Rock added 
that law enforcement was among the professions that “simply could not allow” bad apples: “American 
Airlines can’t be like, ‘You know, most of our pilots like to land; we just got a few bad apples that like 
to crash in the mountains.’” Itzkoff, supra note 49. 
122. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 45.
123. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 8. Emphasis added.
124. Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 92-93.
125. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 70.
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in her oral decision.  Canada’s first Black female judge found her words 
under harsh dissection and reprimand from a majority of Supreme Court 
judges whose own words received significantly different treatment. 
